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Abstract 
Philosophers have identified a number of principles that characterize morality and underlie moral 
judgments. However, philosophy has failed to establish any widely agreed-upon justification for 
these judgments, and an “error theory” that views moral judgments as without justification has 
not been successfully refuted. Evolutionary psychologists have had success in explaining the 
likely origins and mechanisms of morality but have also not established any justification for 
adopting particular values. As a result, we are left with moral nihilism -- the absence of any 
unarguable values or behaviors we must or should adopt. The philosophical and psychological 
implications of this nihilism suggest accepting shared, non-absolute values as “good enough”; a 
revised, humbler view of moral and other value judgments; and the possible acceptance of the 
hard truth of a value nihilism.  
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Crisply defining morality has proven difficult, though there’s some consensus among 
philosophers that it applies to impartial, universal judgments about what is right or obligatory to 
do (e.g., Loeb, 2008; Singer, 1993; Williams, 1985). Finding a basis for these judgments has 
been even more difficult. As Singer (1993) states:  
Can we use this universal aspect of ethics to derive an ethical theory that will give us  
guidance about right and wrong? Philosophers from the Stoics to Hare and Rawls have  
attempted this. No attempt has met with general acceptance. (p. 12) 
 
Mackie (1977) has presented an “error theory” that tries to show that no attempt at justification 
can ever succeed -- that making a moral judgment is always an error. Many have adopted this 
view, including Gill and Nichols (2008), Greene (2002), Joyce (2001), Rosenberg (2011) and 
others (see the contributors to Joyce and Kirchin, 2010). Psychologists and some philosophers 
(e.g., Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2012; Joyce, 2006) have moved to explain morality psychologically -
- rooted in evolution, shaped by culture and providing benefits for human cooperation. Greene 
(2013) refers to this view as “… a consensus that’s been building since Darwin: morality is a set 
of psychological adaptations that allow [sic] otherwise selfish individuals to recap the benefits of 
cooperation” (p. 185). But understanding morality and moral differences as mostly psychological 
still leaves us with Mackie’s moral nihilism -- the lack of any objective basis for grounding our 
beliefs and actions. We are left with the questions of what to believe and how to live given the 
absence of foundations that have historically endured.  
What follows briefly reviews the failure in refuting moral nihilism (or, alternatively, the 
success in establishing it) and its implications. These implications may include the acceptance of 
mostly shared non-absolute values as good enough and a correspondingly revised view of moral 
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judgment and responsibility. They may also include resisting the appeal of false beliefs or 
experiences and accepting the hard truth of a value nihilism.  
Moral Nihilism 
There is no successful chain of reasoning that has been offered as to why we must adopt any 
fundamental value or moral obligation over another, or any at all … the very concept of an 
objective moral truth that commands obedience is, while familiar, unlike any other concept. 
Mackie (1977) has dubbed moral obligation “queer” (in the original sense of the term). Hume 
(1738/1969) observed that any attempt to somehow deduce an “ought” from any observation or 
fact about the world is self-evidently impossible: one can’t arrive at the idea of obligation from a 
description of objective facts without first introducing obligation as some sort of fact.  
That people often act as if there are valid moral commands is clear, as it is that many values 
and behaviors are shared and others are not. But there is no knockdown argument we can offer 
someone who believes deeply in a fundamental value we do not share, or in its greater 
importance than another value. Consider, for example, arguments over abortion that set the 
absolute sanctity of any form of unique human life against the absolute right of control over 
one’s own body, or debates in “trolley” problems over diverting a runaway trolley to kill one 
person in order to save the five in its path (e.g., Thomson, 1985). The variation in moral beliefs 
across and within cultures also argues against the possibility that there exist absolute moral 
obligations that all people recognize (this is the argument from relativity in Mackie, 1977). No 
attempt to rationalize these differences has succeeded. 
It could be argued that the belief that there are no absolute foundations is itself an absolute 
belief. But, rather than being absolute, it is an observation that no rational argument has 
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established absolute values. It leaves open the possibility that evidence may yet be offered that 
proves otherwise. 
Moral Agreement and Disagreement are Arbitrary 
We may judge another’s behavior morally wrong to indicate its inconsistency with what we 
perceive as moral commands, or at least with our deepest feelings and principles about how 
people should treat each other -- principles such as respect for an individual’s rights, maximizing 
the greatest good, acceptance of a social contract, a particular sense of justice, the word of God 
or whatever we believe comprises and justifies that belief (see Rachels, 1993, for a survey of 
moral principles). 
We may assert underlying principles of morality but they remain arbitrary in the absence of 
agreement about their overriding value. This does not prevent us from reasoning with those with 
whom we share values to show that a behavior is in fact consistent or inconsistent with those 
values. These discussions occupy much of what counts as moral debate. Some disagreements can 
also be seen as disagreements over purported facts, such as whether a 24-week-old fetus can feel 
pain. Other disagreements may be over predictions of what will result from a particular behavior: 
will allowing euthanasia, for example, start us down a slippery slope to allowing other behaviors 
we consider unacceptable. However, it is when the facts or likely outcomes are not in dispute and 
discussion breaks down that we are faced with a conflict that debate cannot resolve because of 
the absence of common fundamental values.  
Singer (1993) recommends we accept at least some moral point of view because it can give 
meaning to our lives, something beyond ourselves. The quest for meaning by many people is 
clear, and some claim to have found meaning this way. But others may resist the pragmatism of 
wholeheartedly adopting relatively arbitrary principles.  
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Evolution is the Origin of Morality 
It appears that our moral sense has its origins in evolution (see, for example, Joyce, 2006, and 
Street, 2006). This includes both the very existence and “ought” of moral judgments as well as 
many of our intuitively powerful moral precepts. As many evolutionary psychologists have 
argued, an innate sense of sympathy, tit-for-tat reciprocity and other similar traits probably 
provided evolutionary advantages when they first appeared, increasing the likelihood of the 
survival of the individual or perhaps a group with similar shared characteristics (though the idea 
of group selection remains controversial). Evidence for this includes the nearly universal 
presence of good/bad judgments of some kind, even in infants (e.g., Bloom, 2013). Individual 
choice, culture and, more generally, the sort of human brain given by evolution that allows for 
our apparent ability to choose and the creation of cultures can then take morality far beyond what 
was determined by evolution. Deeply rooted norms become efficient ways for biology and 
culture to maintain the benefits of coordinated behavior -- we do not need to reason through 
every situation -- and norms may reinforce overall beneficial behavior when reasoning alone 
would not suffice. Examples of this include situations where individuals do better only if both 
cooperate rather than act in their apparent self-interest (see Nozick, 2001, on these Prisoner’s 
Dilemma situations). 
But while certain values are likely built in through evolution, produce pleasure and lead to our 
survival, this does not justify particular behaviors without agreement on the underlying value of 
what is innate or productive of survival or pleasure. Values may be shared, and we may jointly 
agree to pursue them. But the fact that they are shared does not compel any obligation to pursue 
them.  
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It is no surprise that specific moral intuitions and developed practices built on them have not 
yielded to a single principle of explanation, such as the greatest good. There is little reason for 
evolution to have crafted us (to the extent we are shaped by evolution) in a way that is simple, 
consistent or clear to rational examination. Only net survival benefit counts for evolution.  
Moral Realism is Unlikely 
Could it yet be possible that there are moral truths even if we cannot establish them by reason 
alone? The existence of transcendent, objective moral truths -- the position known as moral 
realism -- seems unlikely. Joyce (2001) has suggested that most moral philosophers -- though not 
most philosophers overall -- are probably moral realists or they would have been unlikely to 
pursue moral philosophy. That may skew the philosophical literature to that position, but a 
broader reading, as Joyce suggests, shows that most philosophers consider moral realism 
speculative at best.  
A more practical moral realism might mean some principles exist that provide a path to a life 
that most individuals, even if maybe not all, would choose if informed and freely able to choose 
… or they would likely be better off if they made such a choice. However, literary theorist Terry 
Eagleton (2003) reminds us that “people who are brutal and violent can be happy” (p. 122), and 
any principles it would be prudent to follow are still short of obligations one is commanded to 
follow. It is also unlikely that there are moral truths that apply to all behaviors considered 
morally relevant given the complex way our psychological nature develops as a result of biology 
and environment. More conventionally, the split between conservative and liberal attitudes found 
in so many societies suggests at least a bifurcated set of moral principles and possible root 
psychology (and perhaps many more than just two groups if Haidt, 2012, is correct).  
The Source of Moral Disagreement is Psychological 
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 A purely philosophical discussion cannot establish irrefutable moral principles. These 
discussions ultimately rely on the intuitive acceptance or rejection of premises that simply seem 
reasonable or not. Haidt (2001, 2012) has persuasively argued that morality is primarily driven 
by a range of intuitions and emotions. He believes moral discourse plays a role in persuading 
others what to do but only a secondary one in determining what is moral in the first place. 
Similarly, Caputo (2000) has observed that ethical reasoning usually starts with conclusions, not 
premises. This resonates both with traditional philosophical intuitionism -- morality grounded on 
directly perceived intuitions -- and with emotivism -- that morality is more a matter of emotional 
approval/disapproval than specific principles.  
A better way to understand moral judgments would be to view them psychologically. 
Cushman and Young (2009) demonstrated how “the conflict between psychological mechanisms 
is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories” (p. 9), giving 
rise to moral dilemmas among different people and within one person. The role of personality in 
philosophers’ judgments has been demonstrated by Schulz, Cokely, and Feltz (2011), and 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2015) have shown how common biases affect philosophers’ 
judgments. Eisenberg and others (e.g., Athota et al., 2009; Eisenberg, 1986, 2010; Miller and 
Eisenberg, 1988) have written about the role of empathy and other personality factors in 
determining moral reasoning and behavior.1  
The Absence of Free Will Undercuts Moral Responsibility  
Though debates about free will continue, compatibilism is a consensus position among 
philosophers (Bourget and Chalmers, 2014): we appear to have free will -- to have been able to 
                                                
 
1 See Krellenstein (1995) for a discussion on the possible role of individual differences in 
explaining diverse beliefs on difficult problems such as the origin of the universe. 
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have chosen otherwise and be subject to (or subject others to) persuasion or deterrence -- but the 
appearance of free will is actually an illusion, since everything is physically determined. This 
determinism is the result of the chemical and ultimately physical processes that underlie our 
thoughts and behavior. The materialist worldview herein assumed does not allow for any other 
causes.  
As many philosophers have observed (e.g., Greene, 2013; Greene and Cohen, 2004; 
Rosenberg, 2011), the lack of true free will has implications for our notions of responsibility and 
punishment. We already consider those with conventionally understood diminished capacity -- 
children, the mentally unfit, the legally “insane” -- as having only limited responsibility for their 
actions and upon whom it is not fair to impose punishment. But if we accept, as it seems we 
must, that no one has intrinsic freedom to do as they want, then accepting punishment as a “just 
desert” for anyone seems questionable. This position is strengthened by the lack of objective 
moral value. 
This does not mean we need to surrender the concept of responsibility. It is useful to enact 
laws and interpret individuals as responsible for behavior they could in fact be deterred from 
performing (or encouraged to do). We can also isolate them for their or our protection or to deter 
them or others from future undesirable behavior, or to engage in their “rehabilitation” -- 
ultimately a form of adjusting (the causes of) their behavior to produce behavior we prefer. But 
that is a narrower concept of responsibility that we generally entertain.  
Moral Nihilism is Hard to Accept 
Steven Pinker (2002) acknowledges that there is an evolutionary basis for moral nihilism: the 
view that there are no objective moral truths and no resulting guaranteed path to a meaningful 
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and happy life. This is because evolutionary adaptation happens only by chance and persists only 
because of its survival value. Pinker believes (and seems to hope) this nihilism can be avoided 
because moral behavior may have evolved in conformance with an objective morality grounded 
in the logic and benefits of reciprocal, cooperative behavior -- the fact that we benefit overall 
from certain behaviors and that it is hard to argue that someone has an obligation without being 
similarly obliged. Pinker adds that even if there is not an objective morality, our moral sense is 
“real for us” and cannot simply be dismissed.  
But the logic of reciprocal obligation only applies if we already accept someone having an 
obligation to do something rather than just finding it desirable; not wanting you to hurt me does 
not imply you have an obligation not to hurt me (Harman and Thomson, 1996) or what might be 
the resulting obligation for me not to hurt you. The net benefits of cooperation also do not imply 
obligations; a given individual or nation-state at a particular time may be better served by acting 
selfishly.  
While morality is still “real for us,” this too falls short of the objective grounding of morality 
needed to refute moral nihilism. That does not mean that moral practice and discussion are an 
unimportant part of our lives or that we are not willing to live by, enforce, and defend those 
practices. The narrator of John Barth’s The Floating Opera (1956/1988) concludes his 
ruminations on life’s futility this way: “I considered … whether, in the real absence of absolutes, 
values less than absolute might not be regarded as in no way inferior and even be lived by” (p. 
252). But those values cannot be grounded in more than our individual or community 
determination to pursue certain goals and adhere to certain norms of conduct. That lack of 
grounding makes our choice to adhere strongly to our values both tenuous and momentous. 
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Dennett (1996) also tries to avoid the fundamental moral nihilism implied by the materialist, 
evolutionary viewpoint he so forcefully endorses. Sommers and Rosenberg (2003) have observed 
that the Darwinian banishment of a higher purpose should have made Darwinians not only into 
“metaphysical nihilists” but also “ethical nihilists,” and that seeing ethics so “exuberantly 
defended by no less a steely eyed Darwinian than Dennett is something of a surprise” (p. 653). 
Similarly, Joshua Greene (2013) has not exactly renounced his earlier conclusion (in Greene, 
2002) about the impossibility of moral truth but now doubts its certainty, and certainly its 
importance compared to what he sees as the more practical question of how to cope with the 
moral “morass” in which we find ourselves (p. 189). He now looks to ground things on the 
widely shared goals of being happy and avoiding suffering. Sommers (2009) backs away from a 
position that was once more similar to Rosenberg’s and states that Rosenberg’s views no more 
“undermine” our moral judgments than the position could undermine Sommers’ love for his 
daughter (which Rosenberg, 2009, assures him he is not trying to do). Harris (2010) thinks that 
the very science that leads to this nihilism can somehow still salvage objective moral truth, while 
Thagard (2012) thinks neuroscience can show life is objectively meaningful and that it grounds 
what he considers to be our primary interests of work, play, and love.2 
But current science, while not denying these moral judgments, cannot ground them despite 
our strong desire to do so; the is-ought divide remains. The desire for grounding leads to 
sometimes forced attempts to avoid nihilist conclusions that follow from one’s own work and 
that may arise from innate needs to explain what we feel, or for compelling stories in general 
(Rosenberg makes much of this last point). Perhaps the desire to avoid nihilism in enhanced by 
having children, as suggested by the exchange between Sommers and Rosenberg.  
                                                
2 Landau (2013) responds specifically to Thagard on this and on the contingency of any 
particular set of interests. 
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In fact, many philosophers view moral nihilism as obviously wrong, an absolutist position 
against all value as unattractive as a harshly stated absolutism in favor of a particular morality. 
Eagleton (2003) says the nihilist is a “disenchanted absolutist” (p. 214). But a lack of objective 
moral truths does not imply the rejection of (relative) value or human happiness, or attempts to 
better achieve certain shared values (and as science-based is open to revision as scientific facts 
develop or change). Rather, rejecting or waffling on the truth of moral nihilism distorts our 
knowledge of how things are and can encourage the uncompromising behaviors that make it 
difficult to live together harmoniously.  
The Implications of Moral Nihilism 
The existentialist accepts a form of moral (and broader) nihilism but aims to counter it with 
acts of will and choice, creating value where none existed before:  
… existentialists tend to emphasize the conventionality or groundlessness of values, their 
“ideality,” the fact that they arise entirely through the projects of human beings against the 
background of an otherwise meaningless and indifferent world…. For Sartre, “values derive 
their meaning from an original projection of myself which stands as my choice of myself in 
the world.” (Existentialism, 2004/2015) 
 
This may be a good strategy to try to live by, though what will work for one may not work for 
another. More significantly, the sort of nihilism presented here forces us in the end to reject any 
claim that the existentialist can create value through acts of will in more than a personal sense. 
Some people may experience this, others not, and these acts will not necessarily persuade anyone 
of the value of a particular course of action. 
Moral choices, unlike others, are considered obligatory. The absence of actual obligations 
puts morality and other goals and pleasures on a more level playing field. The arguments against 
absolute moral value can be applied to the claimed dominance of any other value and in support 
of a broader value nihilism. Is seeking truth, or the presence or pursuit of beauty, less (or more) 
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important than showing great kindness? All may largely be the accidents of birth, and provide 
pleasure to an individual or society that, if different, are not intrinsically “better” than one 
another. One or another may be judged to provide more benefits to more people. Someone may 
embrace them as better for that reason, and many people may share that viewpoint. But it is not a 
view that can be rigorously defended against those who hold a contrary view.  
As a practical matter, most of us have deep-rooted beliefs, or at least deeply felt emotions 
about what we want or believe is or is not acceptable even if we cannot justify those beliefs and 
do not view them as absolutes. Personal values play a significant role in living the life we do. To 
the extent we examine our beliefs, and we may not very much or at all, we may adopt a 
pragmatic viewpoint, accepting certain things as quasi-foundational. We then reason -- or more 
often rationalize after the fact, if Haidt is correct -- from the beliefs we have and towards the 
goals we have and choose, to the extent we choose them.  
We can choose to be with others with similar values, to express ourselves, to value or love 
others, to exercise competency or control, to maximize our sensual pleasures … or, more 
commonly, some combination of these and others. Perhaps we choose some of these because, for 
us, there really is no other choice, or some choices work better for us even if we cannot ground 
that choice in anything beyond dispute. We choose what we do because of innate temperament 
and the cumulative effects of all we have learned. We do some things simply because they have 
become habitual.  
Most of us strive to be happy and enjoy life one way or another, and the data suggest most 
succeed (Diener and Diener, 1996). If we examine morality closely we come to accept, or not, 
the absence of certain foundations, but overwhelming concern about that is rare. Rosenberg 
(2011) argues that “the notion that we need something to make life meaningful in order to keep 
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living is another one of those illusions.” (p. 280).3 However, we might add that for those who do 
need meaning it seems it can usually be found in the particular people, values, or pleasures we 
embrace.  
Similarly, lack of free will may be more a technical issue that could inform public policy on 
punishment than an everyday operating principle. Sitting back and waiting for non-free-will 
determined behavior to take place gets boring. The point is captured in the title of an article by 
Paul Bloom (2012): “Free Will Does Not Exist. So What?” 
Still, accepting the lack of real free will may have some personal impact. It may relax the 
urgency or import of making decisions and feeling complete responsibility for them. This is not 
to eliminate the useful notion of responsibility as it occurs in law or relationships, or in creating a 
happier life, but it could soften it. It might humble us. It suggests we not take ourselves too 
seriously. Humility also follows from value nihilism itself, as Williams (2013) has observed: 
Conceptualizing ourselves from the perspectives of the universe at large is humbling when we 
consider that our values are just that: ours. And we should cherish them and promote them the 
best we know how. But we shouldn’t delude ourselves into thinking these values are imbued 
with a special intrinsic “goodness” that holds for all rational agents. That’s a philosophical 
pipedream. 
 
Beliefs for Which There is No Evidence 
Some people have an unquestioned and, for them, unquestionable conviction in the way 
people must be treated, or about the purpose of life in general. These unquestioned beliefs may 
loosely be characterized as religious. For certain people, tolerance of other views may not be 
acceptable or make sense. 
                                                
3 This is contrary to Camus (1955), who accepted “the absurd” but thought meaning and value 
must and could be found in confronting and rebelling against life’s meaninglessness.  
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It could be argued that unquestioned beliefs are a benefit to those who have them. Perhaps 
these individuals possess a certain biological disposition to religious belief that is itself the result 
of evolution, e.g., people susceptible to unquestioned beliefs might have been more inclined to 
sacrifice themselves in situations where it furthered the survival of those same genes in offspring 
and related group members. There is some evidence that religious belief is correlated with 
greater overall happiness and longer life expectancy.4  
Does the conviction of people with deeply held religious or moral beliefs imply anything 
about the truth of those beliefs? The positive correlation between a lack of religious belief and 
education and intelligence (Lynn et al., 2009, Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001) suggests that 
conviction alone does not provide support for the truth of beliefs that cannot be demonstrated but 
only seen as self-evident by those who hold them.  
But if there are benefits to certain unquestioned beliefs should we attempt to become believers 
if we are not? Perhaps, if people are able to and so inclined. For many people, setting out to 
believe in something without question is not attractive and probably difficult to achieve, even if 
it can happen more or less unintended. We might recognize having unquestioned beliefs as 
providing greater happiness but still reject seeking them because doing so is inconsistent with 
what currently makes us happy, including valuing what we consider to be more (rather than less) 
knowledge of the world as it really is or valuing the autonomy that such a state would reduce. 
Experiences Which are Not Real 
                                                
4 There are many correlational studies confirming these associations. Questions remain about the 
direction of causation -- does religious belief lead to subjective well-being or do happier people 
tend to be more religious -- but the effect seems to remain when controlling for confounding 
variables. See, for example, McCullough et al. (2000) and Myers and Diener (1995). 
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Similar to choosing beliefs or values that may be false but beneficial is choosing experiences 
that are pleasurable but somehow not real. Nozick (1974) says we might not choose to hook 
ourselves up to “experience machines” that could deliver any kind of reality we chose -- maybe 
the experience of writing a great novel -- because we value our experiences being real in addition 
to having the experiences themselves. Most of the characters in The Matrix (Silver et al., 1999) 
feel the same way. Something like this is probably part of some people’s uneasiness about 
certain forms of psychopharmacology. Psychotherapy seems preferable for many individuals 
seeking relief from their problems because they think it produces its improvements by “really” 
transforming us — our beliefs, behaviors and emotions — rather than by giving us a more 
temporary drug-induced experience. But it is not clear from the evidence that psychotherapy 
always works this way, or that some drugs may not be more transformational. Peter Kramer 
(1993) reports that some people believe the prescribed drugs allowed them to be their “real 
selves” and that the effects of these drugs may continue after their discontinuance. This is not 
surprising. From a materialist perspective, drugs are not fundamentally different from 
psychotherapy or any other form of personality manipulation, including religious conversion. All 
of these, if successful, must work through changes in the brain that produce the desired effects 
with greater or less difficulty, with fewer or more undesirable side effects (and the risk of future 
side effects as yet unknown) and with varying degrees of permanence and related changes (or the 
ability to deliberately reverse them).  
Medication or therapy can also produce effects that we did not explicitly want but with which 
we are happy, or at least newly tolerant. These might include effects that we not only did not 
choose but would have avoided if we knew they would occur. Kramer reports that few patients 
he’s aware of discontinue SSRI-type anti-depressants despite experiencing the common sexual 
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side effect of delayed, or the inability to attain, orgasm. It may be that some patients do not 
simply tolerate these unwanted side effects but no longer experience them as undesirable in the 
same way. This fits with Kramer’s idea that the drugs effect a broader transformation than 
simply addressing symptoms. 
Curtailing Biologically Based Tendencies 
Human nature has evolved and has been encoded in biology, at least in the form of underlying 
tendencies. Our culture also places limitations on us, or makes some choices much harder or 
easier than others. There is an interesting list of behaviors found in all cultures, including sexual 
jealousy and modesty (see Brown, 1991, and Pinker, 1997). However, what is natural or 
culturally produced (and they are often at odds) still has no automatic claim to being of 
paramount value, of making us happy or of being unchangeable. But just how changeable are 
we? 
Curtailing an evolved biological tendency tends to result in frustration. This is especially true 
for the deeply felt motivations (and pleasures), including those involving food and sex, which are 
most directly needed for survival and reproduction.5 This frustration may be reduced or not 
experienced as negatively if in exchange we perceive a personal benefit, or a social benefit that 
returns an indirect personal benefit (as with prohibitions against violence). It may be possible to 
further reduce or eliminate frustration if the tendency can be modified through learning or 
habitual non-practice. Freud (1930/1961) thought our biological instincts could be transformed, 
and needed to be for the sake of civilization, though he did not think satisfaction of the 
                                                
5 It is a long-discussed question whether a life devoted mostly to sensual pleasures can be a 
(maximally?) happy one … or, if not, what the right balance of these versus other pleasures is, at 
least for a given individual. Such discussion is outside the scope of this work, but it can be noted 
that the lack of objective moral principles and values undercuts any distinction between so-called 
“lower” and “higher” pleasures, making the question a clearly empirical one.   
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transformed (sublimated) instincts could be as pleasurable as satisfaction of the original. Few 
theorists today believe that all our pleasures and activities derive their psychic energy from sex 
or other basic instincts. But we sometimes perceive connections or experience passionate 
pleasure from different activities in a similar way, possibly indicating conflated origins and a 
common neurophysiology. 
We choose to develop interests or acquire tastes but have less control over our personality or 
what is most important to us. Some changes may be forced on us, or become a part of us through 
daily routine. We can work towards personal and social transformation and deliberately build 
some changes in ourselves and others over time, to some extent. 
Individual variability and external reinforcement play a significant role in what is possible. 
Most people can learn to control urges for revenge. Some people choose celibacy, while for 
some monogamy is difficult to sustain. Pinker (1997) casts doubt on the 1960’s ambitions of free 
love and an egalitarian society, arguing for the widespread existence, evolutionary origins, and 
great difficulty in overcoming sexual jealousy and competition. Modern day capitalism has lately 
run rampant over alternative economic models in its appeal to a view of human nature based on 
universal and mostly unmodifiable self-interest. But just how desirable (or undesirable) and 
unchangeable are these and other tendencies? These questions remain mostly open. 
Changing Moral Intuitions 
Greene (2008) wonders which innate moral tendencies we might choose to change. He says 
“if science tells me that I love my children more than other children only because they share my 
genes … should I feel uneasy about loving them extra?” (p. 76). Greene does not directly answer 
this question but states that “consequentialist principles [i.e., some form of greatest good 
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reasoning], while not true, provide the best available standard for public decision making and for 
determining which aspects of human nature it is reasonable to change and which ones we would 
be wise to leave alone” (p. 77). Greene’s choice of consequentialist principles for public 
decision-making is pragmatic, reflecting the fact that increasing the common good benefits us in 
ways most of us want even if we cannot argue decisively for those principles. His suggestion that 
we might use the same principles to determine what to change for an individual is less clear and 
more problematic. In his early work, Greene (2002) recognized some utility in preserving 
individual responses such as the desire to punish a wrongdoer, while in the above example 
(Greene, 2008) he suggested it could be worth working towards individual change. Pinker (2002, 
p. 182) argues that the very non-consequentialist, seeming irrationality of some behaviors — he 
refers to the “implacable need for retribution” — provides an indirect consequentialist 
contribution: there will be punishment even if it is not for the greatest good in a particular 
situation, deterring individuals more strongly than a consequentialist calculus could alone. 
Immediate, irrational reactions are also less open to gaming. Greene might respond that, if true, 
the behaviors should be preserved by the very consequentialist standard he is advocating. 
But what if the consequentialist argument for retribution, for example, cannot be made? 
Greene may be right that it is too often at odds with the common good. But the personal, if 
emotional, satisfaction that retribution provides for someone might still be judged without 
contradiction as a practical individual benefit of greater personal value than the value for the 
common good and its indirect individual benefit. Once we are making pragmatic decisions in the 
absence of absolute standards the value criteria by which judgments are made are inevitably open 
to different estimations of personal value, though society as a whole may choose to encourage 
changes (or create certain prohibitions) that a given individual would resist. 
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We Might be Better Off not Using the Word “Moral” 
Given the widespread but apparently false belief that there are true, absolute moral values, it’s 
worth considering if we would be better off eliminating from our vocabulary the words that 
imply the existence of these values -- words including moral, right, and wrong. Such moral 
abolitionism has been suggested by others who have denied the existence of moral absolutes, 
including Burgess (in an early unpublished work finally published in 2007), Garner (2007) and 
Greene (at least in 2002). It might be better to refer to positions one strongly favors or opposes 
rather than to describe them as right or wrong. This would not prevent us from reasoning about 
values and their implications. It would also not prevent us from adopting particular values, from 
supporting/condemning certain actions, or choosing to punish those who violate norms we 
endorse. But it would eliminate language that implies there are values or obligations that 
command obedience of oneself or another because of their objective truth. Discussing values as 
personal and relative (if sometimes strongly held and widely shared) could make moral 
disagreements less intractable and more like other disagreements, increasing the possibilities for 
compromise. Compromise would not be required (nothing is) … but the choice would be more 
accurately framed as a practical decision to compromise or not, rather than a decision that allows 
no compromise by definition. 
Some philosophers who hold that moral values are not absolute nevertheless think we would 
be better retaining the fiction of moral absolutes and continue to speak of right and wrong…and 
that such talk would better reinforce the shared values a community has, providing a net benefit. 
Joyce (2001) has championed such moral fictionalism. Whether this would provide an agreed 
upon net benefit is an empirical question, though one might hope that people could eventually 
see values for what they are while still respecting their importance. Jerry Coyne observed that the 
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feared social disintegration that reduced religiosity might bring about appears not to have 
generally occurred in Scandinavian countries where religious belief has greatly declined.6 
One exception to eliminating the language of moral realism might be for raising children, 
where a simpler approach may be needed to encourage particular behaviors. Greene (2002) 
observes that we might “simply allow or even encourage realist dialogue with those who are too 
young to handle the meta-ethical truth [that there are no moral absolutes]” (p. 279). We could 
hopefully expect more of adults.  
The Angst of Moral Nihilism 
Rosenberg’s (2011) “nice nihilism” espouses an evolutionary-based moral nihilism (and a 
broader nihilism he believes follows from a thoroughly naturalistic point of view) that he 
considers nice because values are mostly shared even if not objectively true. As a result, conflict 
is minimized and we do not have to worry much about abhorrent people. But worry only enters 
the picture if we assume we are in Rosenberg’s “two standard deviations from the mean” of 
people who want to be nice and who want to be treated nicely despite there being no objective 
grounding for that (p. 286). This also implies we are operating on the assumption that people’s 
worries about themselves amount to something. Rosenberg might argue that this is part of our 
illusory sense of what matters and how things influence us.  
If we can’t eliminate our worry, Rosenberg suggests drugs: “If you still can’t sleep at night, 
even after accepting science’s answers to the persistent questions, you probably just need one 
more little thing besides Epicurean detachment. Take a Prozac or your favorite serotonin 
                                                
6 Coyne made this point in a discussion recorded in Forman (2012, Day 3, second session). 
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reuptake inhibitor, and keep taking them till they kick in” (p. 315). The worry is ultimately a 
chemical (brain) problem, so Rosenberg provocatively suggests fixing it chemically. 
But the suggestion misses something. It’s not pseudo-moral qualms about using drugs to 
improve our lives. As Rosenberg points out, mental change is all about rewiring the brain, and 
different methods -- education, therapy, drugs -- may differ in approach (and in effectiveness, 
permanence, side effects, etc.) but there are no (pseudo-) moral differences.  
Rather, the difficulty is that Rosenberg too quickly dismisses the psychological significance 
of a mostly nihilist viewpoint. It is hard to argue with a lack of significance if one starts from 
nihilist principles. But if Rosenberg is willing to grant our (illusory) worries can and should be 
minimized, he might also grant that the (illusory) significance that is reduced for us should count 
for something, even if we do not need absolute values or a complete theory of a meaningful life 
to be happy. There is a reason so many ardent materialists resist materialism’s conclusions about 
the arbitrary nature of morality and value, even if the reason is itself rooted in our evolved 
minds. Prozac may or may not help with any persistent anxiety that comes from this realization. 
It will not, however, dampen our sober appreciation of it. Some of us would also not want it to 
… no more than we would want to enjoy a perfect life by being attached to Nozick’s experience 
machine. 
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